Abstract -This paper studies two-part tariffs and their welfare effects when firms are risk averse. It finds that firms charge a risk premium over expected marginal cost for each unit they sell. This pricing rule is socially optimal if and only if the market is fully covered in equilibrium. Risk-neutral monopoly tends to generate more aggregate net consumer surplus than risk-averse monopoly in partial-cover equilibrium but consumer welfare is indifferent when the market is fully covered. In oligopoly, consumer welfare increases (decreases) in the Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute risk aversion when the number of firms is relatively large (small).
Introduction
It is well-known that marginal cost pricing is socially optimal when consumers have identical preferences. Marginal cost pricing and its Pareto efficiency are retained when a profit-maximizing monopolist is allowed to price the product by twopart tariffs. If consumers are heterogenous and the income effect is ignored, the necessary and sufficient conditions for marginal cost pricing in equilibrium is that the marginal consumer has the same demand as the average consumer (Varian, 1989) .
1 Yin (2004) extends monopoly two-part tariffs to two-part tariff competition in duopoly and finds that the necessary and sufficient conditions for marginal cost pricing remain intact. Armstrong and Vickers (2001) , and Rochet and Stole (2002) demonstrate further that firms choose two-part tariffs when they have the freedom of adopting any nonlinear pricing schemes in duopolistic competition and the two-part tariff involves setting price equal to marginal cost under certain relatively unrestrictive conditions. Studies in two-part tariffs are extensive (for a concise review, see Varian 1989) . Almost all of these analyses ignore uncertainty in the economy or assume firms are risk neutral and profit-maximizing. While the certainty assumption abstracts away the complexity and richness of the real world, the profit-maximizing assumption is due to the Fisher Separation Theorem (Fisher, 1930) , which requires that firms have no market power and financial markets are complete among others. Since the 1 The condition for demand of the marginal consumer equal to the average demand is not restrictive as it sounds. For instance, when consumer heterogeneity is horizontal, as in spatial models, all consumers have the same demand as long as they actively purchase the underling good.
pioneering works of Baron (1970) and Sandmo (1971) , uncertainty and risk aversion of firms have received increasing attention. There are a wide range of reasons that can explain why firms are risk averse. For instance, financial markets are incomplete and imperfect and many firms, particularly small and medium size firms, have limited access to capital markets; Owners may be unable or unwilling to diversify ownership in order to control the firm; Executive managers' income and benefits are usually connected to corporate performance and they are reluctant to bear excessive risk.
From empirical viewpoint, various hedge activities conducted by firms can be interpreted as direct evidence of risk avoidance by firms (Nance et al., 1993; Gézci et al., 1997) . Although literature on risk-averse firms is rich, most studies do not accommodate price discrimination behavior. Baron (1970) and Sandmo (1971) focus on competitive firms under price uncertainty, and Baron (1971) and Leland (1972) extend the analysis to monopoly or imperfect competition under demand uncertainty.
Production cost uncertainty in an oligopolistic market is introduced by Wambach (1999) , and Jellal and Wolff (2005) while Asplund (2002) examines profit uncertainty due to either demand or cost shocks. In addition, Appelbaum and Kaze (1986) , and Jella and Wolff (2005) endogenize the entry of risk-averse firms into an oligopoly.
An exception is Katz et al. (1982) , which studies a firm engaging in third-degree price discrimination and setting different prices for home and foreign markets.
In the same spirit to Katz et al. (1982) , this paper intends to blend the literature of price discrimination with the literature of risk-averse firms under uncertainty to study firm pricing behaviors and their welfare consequences. However, it differs from Katz et al. as it assumes that firms cannot separate buyers ex ante and focuses on two-part tariffs. More specifically, it tries to answer the following questions. Does a risk-averse monopolist or an oligopolistic firm still charge a price equal to its marginal cost when the conditions for marginal cost pricing under certainty are satisfied?
2 Do two-part tariffs in monopoly or oligopoly equilibrium maximize social welfare? Other things being equal, are two-part tariffs imposed by risk-averse firms more harmful to consumers than two-part tariffs imposed by risk-neutral firms?
The uncertainty this paper focuses on is production cost uncertainty although consumers' participation to the market is also random. The reason for this focus is two-fold. First, production costs, particularly variable costs, are subject to various input price and wage shocks. Firms usually do not know these shocks at the time pricing decisions are made and quite often they cannot spontaneously adjust output prices to completely absorb these shocks. Second, it has been demonstrated in the literature that marginal cost pricing does not prevail in monopoly or oligopoly equilibrium and market equilibrium is not socially optimal as long as the demand of marginal consumer is not equal to the average demand (Varian, 1989; Yin, 2004) . It is not surprising that demand uncertainty and risk aversion can destroy marginal cost pricing and social optimality of two-part tariffs in monopoly or oligopoly.
Our analysis starts with a model of two-part tariffs set by a risk-averse monopolist. Consumer heterogeneity is horizontal so that there are only two groups of consumers in the market with a given pricing scheme: buyers and non-buyers, because all buyers have identical demand. In equilibrium, the monopolist charges a price higher than the expected marginal cost. Monopoly equilibrium is not the first best for social welfare maximization if the market is not fully covered (i.e., not all 2 Two-part tariffs involve a fixed fee which must be paid for the access to consuming any amount of good, and then a uniform price for each unit of good purchased. In the literature, the price for each unit is often called marginal price because there is a lump-sum fee to initiate consumption. But for simplicity purpose, we use the term "price" in the paper and use fixed fee interchangeably with lumpsum fee or entry fee.
consumers purchase the good produced by the firm). But the monopoly price and entry fee are usually the first best if the market is fully covered. 3 In comparison with risk-neutral monopoly, consumers are not worse off if and only if the market is fully covered. The intuition behind these results is straightforward. When a firm is risk averse, it requires a risk premium over the expected marginal cost in price to compensate the risk it bears although it can extract the economic rents by lump-sum fee. The risk premium itself does not distort efficiency because a planner maximizing social welfare makes the same compensation to the firm. The distortion is essentially caused by monopoly entry fee, as it is likely to be too high and induce insufficient market coverage. For consumer welfare, we first note that no matter risk averse or not a monopolist always sets the entry fee so high that the marginal consumer has a zero net surplus from the trade. Thus, each interior consumer has the same net surplus as long as the marginal consumer is the same in the two scenarios. In turn, the risk averseness of the firm does not affect aggregate net consumer welfare if all consumers are active.
The oligopoly model in the paper is based on the Salop (1979) spatial model with three new features: random marginal and fixed costs, risk-averse firms and downward-sloping demand. 4 It is found that the oligopoly price in full-competition equilibrium is greater than the expected marginal cost but it can be confirmed that the equilibrium is efficient under additional assumptions that the production costs follow normal distributions and firms have CARA utility. Furthermore, the equilibrium has a 3 Here "usually" means that there is an extra condition for the entry fee being the first best; that is, the monopolist's expected marginal utility under an uncertain profit is equal to the marginal utility at the corresponding certainty equivalent profit. See Proposition 3 for details. The rest of the paper is organized as the following. Section 2 presents a model of two-part tariffs set by a risk-averse monopolist. After analyzing the welfare effects of monopoly equilibrium, the section uses an example to illustrate the details of monopoly equilibrium. Section 3 develops an oligopoly model of two-part tariffs based on the Salop (1979) spatial model and conducts the comparative statics analysis of oligopoly equilibrium. Concluding remarks are given in the final section. Proofs of propositions with tedious algebra are in the Appendix at the end of the paper.
Two-Part Tariffs Set by a Risk-Averse Monopolist
This section considers a market where a monopolist charges a price p and an entry fee e for the product sold in the market. Consumers in the market are characterized by idiosyncratic random variable x ≥ 0 such that the utility from consuming q units of the good is u(q) − tx, where t > 0 is a parameter characterizing the extent of the horizontal heterogeneity of consumers. 
The production of the good incurs a marginal cost c and a fixed cost f. The costs are unknown at the time when the monopolist sets the tariff scheme and are viewed as random variables. They are the sources of uncertainty in the model. It seems plausible to think that the variable and fixed costs are subject to different shocks of production inputs, and consequently the distributions of c and f are assumed to be independent. Since each consumer has demand q(p) and pays a fixed fee e, the monopoly profit from each active consumer is π ≡ (p − c)q(p) + e (gross of fixed costs) and the firm's total profit gained from all active consumers is Π ≡ πN(s) − f.
The monopolist's utility is a function of profit, v(Π), which is increasing and concave, 5 Alternatively, u(q) can be interpreted as the utility of consumption and tx as the consumer's opportunity cost of outside option (see Rochet and Stole, 2002) . In the oligopoly model, t will be interpreted as unit transportation cost and x as the distance between a firm and a consumer.
where the concavity reflects the risk aversion of the monopolist. For such a monopolist, the objective is to maximize the expected utility through the proper choice of price and fee:
where E is the expectation operator. Applying the inverse demand function p = u′(q)
. Thus, if the expected utility is concave in p and e, and has an interior optimum that N(s) < 1, the utility-maximizing price and lump-sum fee can be determined by the first-order conditions:
Because p, q(p) and N(s) are non-random, (2) and (3) imply
On the other hand, if x has a finite support and consumer heterogeneity t is sufficiently small, the solution of (2) and (3) leads to . Then the firm can always properly choose an entry fee high enough to make all consumers buy the product (so that N(s) = 1) but the consumer characterized by x = 1 is indifferent between buying or not buying; i.e.,
Substituting (5) into (1) and maximizing the expected utility with respect to p yield (4) again but N(s) in Π is equal to 1.
Proposition 1.
When the monopolist is risk averse (neutral), the equilibrium monopoly price is higher than (equal to) the expected marginal cost.
It is well-known in the theory of firm under certainty that fixed costs do not have any impact on tariffs or outputs as long as the output is strictly positive. But this is generally no longer true under uncertainty (Sandmo, 1979) as it can been seen from (4) that fixed cost may affect price and lump-sum fee through profit function in the integral. However, this effect disappears in CARA utility. To investigate further the effect of risk aversion on price, let us assume that the marginal cost and fixed cost follow normal distributions. Rewrite (4) as
where Ec c = is the mean of marginal cost. The normality assumption allows us to apply the Stein's Lemma because Π is also normal. So,
where is the variance of marginal cost and
measure of absolute risk aversion (Rubinstein, 1973 (Rubinstein, , 1976 Jellal and Wolff, 2005) .
σ is the risk premium the monopolist charges to consumers. If the monopolist serves all consumers in equilibrium, (i.e., N(s) = 1), the differentiation
and de/dp = −q(p) < 0 by (5), the following proposition is immediate.
Proposition 2. If marginal and fixed costs follow normal distributions and all
consumers are active, the monopoly price (lump-sum fee) increases (decreases) in Rubinstein's measure of absolute risk aversion and the expected value and variance of marginal cost.
It is well-known (see, Varian, 1989 ) that marginal cost pricing is the first best for social welfare under certainty. The conclusion can be easily extended to the case where production costs are uncertain but firms are risk neutral. However, does efficiency still need marginal cost pricing when the monopolist is risk averse? This is a legitimate question because the firm bears not only the costs of production but also the cost of profit uncertainty. To answer the question, we first need to know what the first best price is.
6 Define certainty equivalent profit ( )
Apparently, in (7) is the certainty equivalent profit, s(p,e)N(s) is the aggregate consumer surplus (ignoring idiosyncratic disutility) and 
Although these two conditions yield the same relationship between price and lumpsum fee as (4), it does not necessarily mean the monopoly two-part tariff is the first best. More specifically, the left-hand side of (8) has an extra negative term, , than its counterpart in (2) and (9) has an extra negative term, , than (3). This means that ∂W/∂p and ∂W/∂e are negative if they are evaluated at the monopoly price and fee determined by (2) and (3).
If x has a finite support and t is small enough, the market is fully covered with price and fee determined by (8) and (9). Then the welfare planner should maximize the welfare function ,
( )
where π − f is the profit when all consumers are served. The first-order conditions of welfare maximization can be found by setting N(s) = 1 and N'(s) = 0 into (8) and (9).
These conditions imply
which is the same as (4) when the market is fully covered. Moreover, it can be easily shown that W in (10) is independent of lump-sum fee e if .
This independence means lump-sum fee is irrelevant to social welfare as long as the price is determined by (11). Summing up the analysis, the main results can be stated as the following proposition.
Proposition 3. (i) If the market is not fully covered in monopoly equilibrium, neither
price nor lump-sum fee is the first best. (ii) If the market is fully covered in equilibrium, monopoly price is the first best. Moreover, if the expected marginal utility under an uncertain profit is equal to the marginal utility at corresponding 7 An example of utility that holds is CARA utility,
, and we will use it extensively in the analysis below.
certainty equivalent profit (i.e., ), monopoly equilibrium maximizes social welfare.
It should be mentioned that the first best outcome obtained in monopoly equilibrium is the first best which makes consumers worst off because they pay a highest possible lump-sum fee (provided all consumers are still active). As Propositions 2 and 3 state, risk aversion is the sole reason for a risk-averse monopolist charging a price higher than the expected marginal cost. But a higher price does not necessarily hurt consumers because the lump-sum-fee also plays a role in the determination of consumer surplus. Then, the question is whether the risk aversion of the firm definitely makes consumers worse off. To investigate this, we compare the consumer welfare when the monopolist is risk neutral with consumer welfare when the monopolist is risk averse. Recalling demand is the same for all consumers who buy the product and the monopolist sets a lump-sum fee to extract all surplus the marginal consumer has (i.e., the marginal consumer is indifferent between buying or not buying), consumer x has net surplus t(x m − x), where x m indexes the marginal consumer. So, the relative magnitude of consumer welfare is determined by the market coverage. Note, the condition in the proposition does not impose a significant restriction because the log-concavity of
An Example of Risk-Averse Monopoly
Let us consider a monopolist with the CARA utility ) exp( ) (
where R is the Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute risk aversion. Assume the marginal and fixed costs are normally distribute that ) , ( 
When the market is fully covered, the equilibrium price can be obtained by setting N(s) = 1 in the above equation. As indicated earlier, the first best price and lump-sum fee must satisfy the same relationship as (6) or (12), which means that the monopolist does not overcharge risk premium to extract the economic rents. Similar to monopoly under certainty, the rents are extracted by lump-sum fee. The essential cause of monopoly inefficiency in the case of N(s) < 1 is the higher monopoly lump-sum fee than the social optimum.
To explicitly solve the problem, let us assume that x is uniformly distributed on [0, 1], and an individual consumer's demand function is linear that q(p) = a − bp.
Thus, s(p, e) = (a − bp) 2 /2b − e. If t is small (the condition will be specified below), the market is fully covered in equilibrium. Then, (12) yields monopoly price, 
The condition for the market being fully covered in equilibrium is that the consumer characterized by x = 1 has non-negative net surplus under a non-negative lump-sum fee. From (14), it requires . ) 1 ( 2 ) ( The aggregate net consumer surplus is independent of our particular assumptions of normal distributions, CARA utility and linear demand. As mentioned earlier, the net consumer surplus of consumer x is t(x m − x). Thus, for a full-cover market, the aggregation can be found by integral
Two-Part Tariff Competition by Risk-Averse Firms

3.1) Market Equilibrium
We consider an oligopoly where n firms with random production costs are evenly distributed on a Salop (1979) circle with a unit length. Consumers are 9 The example given in the previous section can be considered as a monopoly firm on the Salop circle.
continuously and uniformly distributed on the circle too and have to pay a transportation cost of tx for travelling to a firm, where x is the distance between the consumer and the firm and t is the unit transportation cost. For the convenience of discussion, it is assumed that the difference between tariffs set by different firms is small so that a consumer only needs to decide which of the two neighbouring firms to purchase from. In turn, each firm has only two rivals, one on the left arc of the circle and the other on the right. 
Like the monopoly case, the firm chooses p and e to maximize its expected utility,
. The first-order conditions for the maximization are:
With the same manipulation as in the monopoly case, we find the equilibrium requires
which is the same as (4) although Π now is given by (15). Following the same proof as Proposition 1, it can be easily shown the proposition below holds.
Proposition 5. In full-competition oligopolistic equilibrium, the firms set a price greater than the expected marginal cost.
As (4a) illustrated, the price is equal to the expected marginal cost when the firms are risk neutral. This is consistent with Yin's (2004) finding of marginal cost pricing under certainty. However, the firms charge a risk premium when they are risk averse. In other words, risk aversion is the reason for above-marginal-cost-pricing.
To investigate oligopoly equilibrium in detail, we assume from now on that all firms have the same CARA utility and normal distribution of marginal and fixed costs as specified in the example in Section 2. Then the maximization of an oligopolistic firm's expected utility is equivalent to maximize its certainty equivalent profit:
The first order conditions are:
Since in symmetric equilibrium, reorganizing (18) and (19) we find the equilibrium oligopoly price is characterized by
This formula is equivalent to monopoly pricing strategy (12) if one notices that an oligopolistic firm serves 1/n consumers. To examine the efficiency of oligopoly equilibrium with an exogenous number of firms, let us consider the welfare function:
Since the welfare function is independent of e, we only need to consider the first order condition with respect to p. Routine calculation shows the first best price is also characterized by (20). Thus, we obtain the same conclusion as in the monopoly case.
Proposition 6. In full-cover symmetric equilibrium, the oligopolistic market is efficient in terms of maximizing social welfare. 
Substituting this price into (19) we obtain equilibrium entry fee:
The comparison of (21) and (13) shows that oligopoly price reduces to monopoly price when the number of firms declines to 1. However, the functional form of oligopoly entry fee in (22) completely differs from the monopoly fee in (14).
Particularly, the former increases in unit transportation cost t while the latter decreases in t. Why are the effects of t on lump-sum fee so different? In monopoly, the firm has absolute market power to grab the economic rents by extracting consumer surplus through lump-sum fee. If the unit transportation cost is lower, consumer surplus is higher. But this efficiency gain in transportation does not eventually benefit consumers as the monopolist can raise lump-sum fee to capture more profits. On the other hand, competition in oligopoly forcefully restricts the firms' market power. But a rise in t enhances product differentiation as a consumer views the two neighbouring products more differentiated, and in turn it amplifies the market power of all firms. Thus, they are more capable to lift their lump-sum fees.
A consumer, who purchases the product from a firm which is x units away from him/her, has net consumer surplus 
11 Note, the inequality in (23) holds when the condition for full-cover monopoly equilibrium Technical conditions (23) and (24) ensure a positive lump-sum fee, and that the price and lump-sum fee determined by (21) and (22) lead to full-competition equilibrium.
So we assume they hold in the analysis.
3.2) Comparative Statics of Market Equilibrium
Proposition 7. Under the specified assumptions of the model, oligopoly price determined by (21) increases in the risk-aversion measure R, the expected value ( c ) and variance ( ) of marginal cost, but decreases in the number of firms n, and is independent of the unit transportation cost t. The price is equal to the expected marginal cost when n tends to infinite, and R or tends to zero. The lump-sum fee of (22) This non-monotonic effect of risk aversion on consumer welfare also differs from the findings of Asplund (2002) , and Jellal and Wolff (2005) from oligopolistic competition among risk-averse firms by linear pricing that equilibrium price rises as firms become more risk averse and consequently consumers are definitely worse off.
3.3) Market Equilibrium with Endogenous Entry
In the previous analysis, the number of firms in the industry is exogenously given. Now we endogenize the entry process and consider long-run oligopoly equilibrium. Because a firm receives a zero profit with certainty if it does not enter the market, entering stops when the incumbents in the market receive a zero certainty equivalent profit. In symmetric equilibrium, the certainty equivalent profit can be
Substituting the equilibrium price and entry fee in (21) and (22) into (25), it is easy to find that monotonically declines in n and becomes negative when n is sufficiently large. The unique number of firms in long-run equilibrium can be characterized by
To study the effect of risk aversion on the equilibrium number of firms in the market, we take derivative of with respect to R to find the sign of To determine the optimal number of firms, the social planner maximizes the following welfare function:
Because the equilibrium oligopoly price is efficient with a given number of firms, the first best price can be determined by (21) with n relaced by . Applying the envelope theorem, the first-best number of firms can be characterized by 
22
The question of whether free entry in a decentralized market results in an efficient number of firms or not can be answered by comparing with . The first observation from (26) and (28) is that the expected value and variance of fixed cost have no impact on the relative magnitude of the two numbers. Second, there are too many firms in oligopoly equilibrium (i.e., > ) when R is sufficiently small (i.e., the firms are risk averse but not severe). Third, consistent with the findings by Appelbaum and Kaze (1986) , we cannot make an unambiguous conclusion on whether is greater or smaller than in general.
This ambiguity on the equilibrium number of firms is in contrast to Jellal and Wolff (2005) , who find that the market generates too many firms in long-run equilibrium. The Jellal-Wolff model is similar to ours but pricing schemes are restricted to linear pricing and consumers are restricted to the discrete choice of buying one unit or not buying. Allowing for pricing discrimination and downward-sloping demand, the Jellal-Wolff's conclusion holds in our model when the risk aversion of firms is sufficiently small.
Concluding Remarks
This paper examines two-part tariffs set by a monopolistic firm or competing oligopolistic firms. When profits are uncertain and firms are risk averse, marginal cost pricing does not prevail in equilibria. Rather, firms charge a risk premium over the expected marginal cost for each unit of product they sell. This premium represents the true social cost of risk when the market is fully covered in equilibrium but it deviates from the social optimum when the market is not fully covered. The 13 For instance, the solutions to (26) and (28) Then, let t increase or decrease slightly and both > and < can occur.
effects of the risk aversion of firms on consumer welfare depend on the market structure. Other things being equal, risk-neutral monopoly tends to generate more aggregate net consumer surplus than risk-averse monopoly in partial-cover equilibrium but consumer welfare is indifferent when the market is fully covered. In contrast, consumer welfare increases as firms in an oligopolistic market become more risk averse if there is a relatively large amount of firms in the industry.
A pricing scheme of two part-tariff can be considered as a special form of nonliear pricing, where marginal price has a jump at zero and then it keeps constant as quantity increases. It will be interesting to know whether risk-averse firms will adopt two-art tariffs when they are permitted to use general nonlinear pricing schemes, as found by Armstrong and Vickers (2001) , and Rochet and Stole (2002) in risk-neutral oligopoly. This is an interesting question for future research.
is independent of c and 0
is constant so that c p = from (4).
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4
We use superscripts A and N to denote the risk-neutral and risk-adverse monopolies, respectively. With the discussion in the text, we only need to show and the inequality is strict when for the proof of the proposition.
Since the expected profit is
the optimal marginal consumer chosen by the risk-neutral monopolist when is determined by 
where inequality strictly holds when . With the same proof in Proposition 1, it can be shown that 
Proof of Proposition 7
We focus on the effects of R and n. The effects of t, c and either can be proved similarly or are obvious. Q.E.D.
